BETANCOURT AND THE NARROW CERTIORARI

SCOPE OF REVIEW OF APPEALS FROM ACT 111
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION AWARDS: ITS TIME
HAS ALREADY COME AND GONE
John P. McLaughlin & Patrick J. Harveyt
It has long been established that arbitration is the "highly valued and
greatly favored" means of resolving labor disputes-in both the public and
private sector-in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.' As with federal
labor policy, the basis for Pennsylvania's strong policy in favor of
arbitration is the belief that arbitration is both less formal and less
expensive than litigation. Many courts also characterize arbitration as a
faster means of dispute resolution, although that is not always an accurate
characterization.
Perhaps more importantly, arbitration is seen as "a prime force in the
policy of reducing industrial strife" because it is "more responsive to
individual needs and preferential in light of the ongoing relationship
between employer and union."2 As the Cheney University court noted, the
importance of arbitration under Pennsylvania labor policy is perhaps best
highlighted by § 903 of the Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act which
mandates "final and binding" arbitration of disputes between employees
and employers governed by the Act.3
The strong labor policy in favor of arbitration notwithstanding, courts
have not completely relegated to arbitrators the task of resolving labor
disputes. Although arbitration awards are generally "final and binding,"
they are not absolute, and in rare cases court review is available. The
challenge involved in allowing such review is balancing the interests and
policies involved in collective bargaining while exercising the proper
t Patrick J. Harvey and John P. McLaughlin are partners with Ballard Spahr Andrews
& Ingersoll, LLP. Mr. Harvey and Mr. McLaughlin work in Ballard Spahr Andrews &
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I. See State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Ass'n,
743 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. 1999).
2. Id.
3. See Cheney Univ., 743 A.2d at 410.
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degree of review of grievance arbitration awards.
In Pennsylvania, courts reviewing arbitration awards apply the
"essence test" adopted from federal labor policy and the Uniform
Arbitration Act and the "narrow certiorari" scope of review.4 This article
will discuss the development and policies supporting both standards.
Although both standards have their advantages and disadvantages, the
narrow certiorari scope of review simply does not accommodate all of the
concerns and interests involved in grievance arbitration or collective
bargaining. The standard does not further the goals of Pennsylvania labor
policy as applied to collective bargaining and grievance arbitration. Its
application to certain grievance awards in Pennsylvania should be changed
by legislative action.
I.

THE ESSENCE TEST AND THE PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS ACT

For years Pennsylvania courts, like their federal counterparts, have
applied the essence test when reviewing a grievance arbitration award. 5 In
Community College of Beaver County, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court relied on the reasoning established by the United States Supreme
Court in the well-known Steelworkers Trilogy and confirmed that the
essence test was appropriate under Act 195.6
Unlike the federal courts, however, the Pennsylvania courts have
struggled over defining the essence test consistently. Although it should
perhaps be relabeled the "Pennsylvania essence test," it appears that the
current essence test under Pennsylvania law can be best stated as a two-part
analysis:
First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is
within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second,
if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately
before the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the
arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be derived from the

4. See infra, Part I, for a discussion of the essence test, and see also infra, Part II, for a
description of the narrow certiorari scope of review.
5. See Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, Soc'y of
Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977). Grievance arbitration involves a dispute
over the interpretation of a term or provision of a collective bargaining agreement. See
Upper Makefield Township v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 753 A.2d 803, 805 n.2 (Pa. 2000).
6. Id. at 1272 (citing United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
7. Compare Dauphin County Technical Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Dauphin County Area
Vocational-Technical Sch. Bd., 398 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1978) with Del. County v. Del. County
Prison Employees Indep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 1998).
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collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only
vacate an arbitrator's award where the award indisputably and
genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow
from, the collective bargaining agreement!
The inconsistency of the Pennsylvania courts in defining the limits of
the essence test appears to be the result of an attempt to balance the
significant competing interests that are in play when reviewing grievance
arbitration awards. On one hand, the courts in the Commonwealth have
recognized the need for a reviewing court to exercise deference to an
arbitrator's award. The parties bargained for an arbitrator to resolve a
dispute and, generally, a court has no business interfering with that
agreement.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that
arbitrators are far from infallible. Pennsylvania courts have thus ensured
that a reviewing court has the authority to vacate an arbitrator's award
when the arbitrator has rewritten the agreement between the parties to
impose an award that "is so illogical" that the parties could not have
possibly intended the result, or where the arbitrator has simply imposed his
or her "own brand of industrial justice." 9 In striking that balance, the
Pennsylvania courts have allowed the review of grievance arbitration
awards under the essence test, but have mandated that such review be ever
so slight and deferential. A court cannot overturn a grievance arbitration
award merely because it determines the result is factually or legally
incorrect.
II.

ACT Ill AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION

The essence test is designed to promote and protect the
Commonwealth's labor policy favoring arbitration and the interests that
both employers and employees have in making sure that an arbitrator's
award is based on the contract they bargained and is not the product of an
illogical analysis or "insanity."10 Unfortunately, it is not the only standard
utilized by Pennsylvania courts to review grievance arbitration awards.
In Pennsylvania, Act 195 governs the labor relations and collective
bargaining of most non-uniformed public employees. Another statute,
commonly referred to as Act 11 1," governs the collective bargaining rights

8. Cheney Univ., 743 A.2d at 413.
9. Cheney Univ., 743 A.2d at 410, 413. See also Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. at 597 (noting that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice.").
10. Cheney Univ., 743 A.2d at413.
11. See 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10.
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and obligations of police and fire personnel and their employers. Act 111
outlines a procedure for uniformed personnel to engage in such purported
bargaining culminating in binding interest arbitration pursuant to specified
procedures." In exchange for binding interest arbitration, the legislature
withheld the right of police and fire personnel to strike because their
services were deemed to be critical to the public safety and welfare. 3
14
The provisions of Act 111 deal mainly with interest arbitration.
Shortly after Act 111 was enacted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided that the narrow certiorari scope of review applied to an appeal of
an Act 111 interest arbitration award.' 5 Under that scope of review, a
reviewing court is limited to reviewing questions concerning: 1) the
jurisdiction of the arbitrators; 2) the regularity of the proceedings; 3) an
excess of the arbitrator's powers; and 4) deprivation of constitutional
rights. 16 The question that resulted was whether the same standard applied
to the review of Act 111 grievance arbitration awards.
Grievance arbitration is barely mentioned in Act 11, except for one
brief reference in § 1.17 Due in part to Act Ill's lack of specificity
regarding grievance arbitration, a debate arose, prior to 1995, regarding
whether the essence test applied to an appeal of a grievance arbitration
award under Act 111.
III. BENTANCOURT AND THE APPLICATION OF THE NARROW CERTIORARI
SCOPE OF REVIEW TO ACT

111 GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION AWARDS

In 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted head-on the
question of whether the essence test or the narrow certiorari scope of
12. See Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon, 498 A.2d 1305
(Pa. 1985).
13. Upper Makefield Township v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 717 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 753 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2000) (citing Township of
Moon, 498 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1985)).
14. See 43 P.S. 217.1-217.10; Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers' Ass'n
(Bentancourt), 656 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1995). Interest arbitration is an arbitration hearing and
procedure that results under Act 111 after the parties are unable to agree on the terms of a
new collective bargaining agreement. Upper Makefield Township, 753 A.2d at 805 n.2.
15. City of Washington, Pa. v. Police Dep't of Washington (Washington Arbitration),
259 A.2d 437, 441 (Pa. 1969).
16. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to apply the narrow certiorari
scope of review in Washington Arbitration was based on the fact that Act I1l specifically
prohibited appeals from an arbitration award. That prohibition, the Court ruled, had to be
viewed in light of what was then Supreme Court Rule 68 1/2 which stated that "if an appeal
is prohibited by an Act ... the law is well settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the
nature of a narrow certiorari .
I..."
ld. Although Rule 68 1/2 was later rescinded, the
Pennsylvania courts still applied the narrow certiorari scope of review to the appeals interest
arbitration awards under Act 11l. Township of Moon, 498 A.2d at 1305.
17. 43 P.S. § 217.1.
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review applied to the review of Act 111 grievance arbitration awards. The
Court decided on the latter and its decision, although not unexpected, has
been plaguing public employers and their uniformed employees ever since.
Shortly after the Court decided Bentancourt, the legacy of that decision
was compounded by the Court's rejection of a public policy overlay on its
Bentancourtholding. 18
In Bentancourt, a Pennsylvania state trooper was suspended for 30
days without pay for conduct unbecoming based on allegations that he
exposed his penis while on duty at police headquarters during a
conversation with other officers. After the incident the officer was placed
on restricted duty performing janitorial work awaiting his court martial
hearing.'9
After his court martial hearing, the officer appealed the discipline
through the grievance and arbitration procedure. The arbitrator determined
that the officer's conduct did not fit precisely within the definition of
conduct unbecoming and that the officer was adequately punished when he
was placed on restricted duty and required to perform janitorial work for a
two-month period between the date of the incident and his court martial
hearing.2 °
In deciding whether the narrow certiorari scope of review, and not the
essence test, applied to an appeal of a grievance arbitration award under
Act 11, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied, to a large extent, on the
fact that it was Act 111 and not the Uniform Arbitration Act that authorized
grievance arbitration for police and fire personnel." The Court then
reviewed the history of Act Ill and determined that since uniformed
personnel in Pennsylvania did not have the right to strike, the legislature
did not intend for labor disputes involving such personnel to be bogged
down in "protracted litigation. 2 2 The legislature, the Court reasoned,
intended a swift resolution to any labor dispute under Act 111 and
safeguarded that intent by expressly prohibiting appeals from an arbitration
award.23
18. See Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n (Smith), 741 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999).
19. Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers' Ass'n (Bentancourt), 656 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa.
1995).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 88. The Uniform Arbitration Act applies only to a "collective bargaining
agreement to arbitrate controversies between employers and employees or their respective
representatives only where the arbitration pursuant to this subchapter is consistent with any
statute regulating labor and management relations." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b)
(West 1998).
22. Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 89.
23. Id. See 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) ("[n]o appeal [from an arbitration award] shall be
allowed to any court."). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that in Washington
Arbitration it authorized a "limited right of review" of interest arbitration awards under the
narrow certiorari scope of review. The Court noted that the Pennsylvania legislature was
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The Bentancourt court concluded that allowing greater review of an
Act 11 1 grievance arbitration award through the essence test would be
contrary to the legislative intent behind Act 111. The Court found that the
legislature intended Act 11 1 grievance arbitration awards to be subject to
no greater judicial review than interest arbitration awards. Characterizing
the essence test as "markedly broader" than the narrow certiorari scope of
review, the Court ruled that applying the essence test would "interfere
impermissibly with the legislative scheme as the courts would be able to
alter Act 111 arbitration awards by means of an unauthorized expansion of
the proper scope of review. 24
IV. THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS FOR APPEAL UNDER THE
NARROW CERTIORARI STANDARD OF REVIEW

Several years later, in 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
narrowed the potential scope of review of Act 111 grievance arbitration
awards even further by holding that public policy prohibits Pennsylvania
courts from disturbing arbitration awards as well.25 In Smith II, a state
trooper, while off duty, became intoxicated and got into an argument with
an ex-girlfriend. The argument was highlighted by the state trooper
jamming his loaded, police-issued weapon into his ex-girlfriend's mouth
and threatening to kill her. The state trooper was arrested later that day for
driving under the influence, simple assault, and making terroristic threats,
charges to which he subsequently plead guilty. The Pennsylvania State
Police then terminated the officer's employment.26
The arbitrator determined that the officer had committed the acts in
question. Nevertheless, he determined that the penalty of discharge was too
excessive. The arbitrator based his decision primarily on the fact that the
conduct in question was less egregious than actions of other troopers who
received less discipline.
He also relied on the fact that the officer
purportedly had an exemplary record over a thirteen-year career and had
been under stress as a result of working at the crash site of a USAir jet in
the fall of 1994.27
The State Police attempted to vacate the arbitrator's award, arguing
that the decision was contrary to public policy and thus the arbitrator
exceeded his powers under the narrow certiorari scope of review. The
well aware of the Washington Arbitration decision in 1974 when it repealed portions of Act
II without modifying the scope of review. Bentancourt, 656 A.2d at 89 n.15. (citing
Washington Arbitration, 259 A.2d at 440).
24. Bentancourt,656 A.2d at 89.
25. See Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n (Smith II), 741 A.2d 1248, 1252-53
(Pa. 1999).
26. Id. at 1250.
27. Id.
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Supreme Court rejected that argument. The Court found that adopting the
argument proffered by the State Police would impermissibly broaden the
narrow certiorari scope of review. The Court concluded that "public
policy" was a "nebulous concept" and ruled that broadening the narrow
certiorari scope of review to include such a basis for review would "greatly
expand the scope of review in these matters" and "markedly increase the
judiciary's role in Act I I arbitration awards. 28
V.

IT Is TIME TO REEXAMINE THE BETANCOURTINARROW CERTIORARI
SCOPE OF REVIEW.

The Betancourt decision and the application of the narrow certiorari
scope of review have been in place for almost eight years. Public
employers, labor unions and attorneys have learned to live with it, but they
certainly do not like it. Although there have been repeated comments from
the courts, particularly the Commonwealth Court, regarding the
inappropriate nature of that standard as applied to the review of Act 111
grievance arbitration decisions, the law has not changed and is not likely to
change in the near future.
The legislature has taken no action to modify the "Betancourt
standard" even though Act 111 has been amended since 1995.29 Likewise,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not even attempted to revisit its
decision. In fact, the Supreme Court decided against broadening the scope
of review in its Smith decision in 1999. Thus, it appears that the
"Betancourt standard" is here to stay. Such a prospect, however, appears to
be counterproductive to Pennsylvania labor policy, collective bargaining,
and grievance arbitration.
If the purpose of the narrow certiorari scope of review is solely to
reduce the degree of judicial scrutiny of Act Ill grievance arbitration
awards, and perhaps provide a disincentive for parties to appeal such
awards, the Betancourt decision has been successful. That purpose,
however, is not entirely consistent with Pennsylvania labor policy and is
problematic in several significant ways.
Regardless of whether a grievance arbitration ° arises under Act 195 or
Act 111, the purpose of grievance arbitration is the same. Through
28. Id. at 1252-53.
29. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n, 698 A.2d 688, 694 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997) (citing Commw v. Willson Products, Inc., 412 Pa. 78, 87, 88, 194 A.2d
162 (Pa. 1963); Loeb Estate, 400 Pa. 368, 162 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa. 1960)), aff'd, 741 A.2d
1248 (Pa. 1999).
30. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.101 (West 1991). Act 195 withheld the right to

strike and mandates binding interest arbitration, substantially similar to Act 111,
only with
respect to court employees and guards at prisons and mental hospitals. Thus, it is possible
for a grievance arbitration to arise under Act 195 as well.
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grievance arbitration, the parties have bargained for a neutral third party to
31
resolve disputes involving the interpretation of their agreement. It is that
expectation and intent that supports the general view that a court has "no
business" overruling an arbitrator simply because it disagrees with the
arbitrator's interpretation of the bargaining agreement.32
At the same time, federal and state courts have recognized that the
deferential approach to reviewing arbitration awards must assure that an
arbitrator "cannot sit as King. 33 Such deference has limitations and, as a
result, since the arbitrator is only empowered to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement and not rewrite it or dispense his or her "own brand
of industrial justice," an arbitrator's award is only "legitimate" if it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 34 "When the
arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."35
The fact that one of the parties in the grievance arbitration is a police
officer or fireman or that the employee's right to engage in collective
bargaining arises under Act 111 or Act 195 does not change the purpose of
grievance arbitration, the role it has in the collective bargaining relationship
between the parties, or the role of the arbitrator, particularly in the public
sector.16 It also should not change the role of a court reviewing a grievance
arbitration award. Under the narrow certiorari scope of review, however,
an arbitrator can completely ignore the bargaining agreement and courts are
helpless to correct the arbitrator's "infidelity to this obligation" 37 to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
The Commonwealth Court's decision in Bensalem Township v.
Bensalem Township Police Benevolent Ass'n 38 is a classic example of how
a court is powerless under the Betancourt standard to correct an arbitration
award in which an arbitrator has essentially rewritten the parties'
agreement or issued an award that is so illogical that the parties never

31. See, e.g., State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l
Ass'n, 743 A.2d 405,413 (Pa. 1999).
32. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (1960).
33. Cheyney Univ., 743 A.2d at 411.
34. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.

35. Id.
36. As noted by Commonwealth Court Judge Pellegrini in Smith, arbitrators involved in
disputes between public sector employees should generally consider other concerns and
considerations relating to the public trust and whether public employees, particularly
uniformed employees, properly serve the community in which they are employed. Pa. State
Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n (Smith), 698 A.2d 688, 694 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
Such considerations, however, are not part of the Betancourt scope of review.
37. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.

38. 803 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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intended or expected to be so bound.3 9 In Bensalem Township, the
township discharged a police officer who was subsequently reinstated by
an arbitrator. The collective bargaining agreement prohibited an arbitrator
from awarding monetary relief in excess of one year. The arbitrator,
however, not only reinstated the officer, but awarded him twenty-one
months of back pay and benefits-nine months more than the parties
authorized him to award under the collective bargaining agreement.40
As the court recognized, the arbitrator issued an award that was
expressly prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless,
under the narrow certiorari scope of review, the court was powerless to
vacate or even adjust the award. Although the township argued that the
arbitrator had acted outside his jurisdiction by issuing a remedy that was
expressly prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement, the
Commonwealth Court rejected that argument. 4' The court reasoned that the
township was basically asking it to apply the essence test. 42 The
Commonwealth Court thus affirmed an award that did not draw its essence
from the agreement or uphold the bargain between the parties and was not
within the intent of the parties. Such a result was clearly not the purpose of
Pennsylvania's labor policy or the court; nevertheless, the court upheld the
award "only because [it was] compelled to do so" under the narrow
certiorari scope of review.43

Likewise, in City of Philadelphiav. FraternalOrder of Police, Lodge
No. 5, 44 an arbitrator reinstated a Philadelphia police officer who had
crashed her police cruiser into parked cars while under the influence of
alcohol and cocaine. The city appealed, but the court was once again
forced to enforce the award. 45 Even though the court agreed that the police
officer's conduct was "certainly appalling," it found itself handcuffed by
the narrow certiorari scope of review and could not consider public policy
arguments to overturn the award.

46

Under the essence test, Smith, City of Philadelphia, Bensalem
Township, and several other cases probably would have been decided
differently. The important point, however, is not whether those and other
grievance arbitration awards would have been affirmed or vacated. Rather,
39. Id. at 242-43.
40. Id. at 242.
41. Id. at 242-43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 243.
44. 711 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
45. Id. at 1061.
46. Id. at 1062. See also Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass'n (Smith), 698 A.2d
688 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (affirming the reinstatement of a police officer who drove
while intoxicated, jammed his service weapon in his former girlfriend's mouth and
threatened to kill her, and then pleaded guilty to the resulting criminal charges).
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the focus of the court's review in those cases would and should have been
on the collectively bargained agreement and enforcing the intent of the
parties. That is the purpose of resolving disputes through grievance
arbitration, and it should be the purpose of judicial review of arbitration
awards.
That purpose applies with respect to employees under Act 195 and Act
111 alike. The intent and contractual provisions of public employers,
police, and fire personnel whose relationship is governed by Act 111 is no
less important than that of public employers and public employees whose
relationship is governed by Act 195. The narrow certiorari scope of
review, as applied to grievance arbitration appeals, does not protect these
significant interests.
Results such as those in Bensalem Township and Smith erode
confidence in the arbitration process and, over time, will weaken the
confidence the parties have in collective bargaining.
Indeed, if a
contractual provision or the intent of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement is going to be ignored or rendered meaningless by arbitral fiat
and approved by the judiciary, what is the purpose of collective bargaining
under Act 111 ? Such erosion in the confidence employers and employees
have in collective bargaining and the grievance arbitration process is a
serious matter since both principals form one of the cornerstones of labor
policy in Pennsylvania.
The application of the narrow certiorari scope of review to Act 111
grievance arbitration awards is based on the history and purpose of Act 111
as detailed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Betancourtdecision. The
linchpin of the Court's reasoning was that since grievance arbitration under
Act 111 is authorized by Act 11, the same scope of review applicable to
interest arbitration awards under Act 111 should apply. 47
As the
Betancourt Court acknowledges, however, Act 111 provides detailed
procedures for interest arbitration, but no such direction for grievance
arbitration.48 In fact, a review of Act 111 reveals that except for a brief
statement in § I of Act 111 that provides "the right to an adjustment or
settlement of grievances and disputes in accordance with the terms of [Act
111 ],' 49 there is no mention of grievance arbitration in the statute. 50 In
47. Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers' Ass'n (Trooper James Betancourt), 656 A.2d
83 (Pa. 1995).
48. Id. at 87. Unlike Act 195, Act 111 does not expressly mandate grievance
arbitration. See also Upper Makefield Township v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 717 A.2d 598,
601-03 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), affd on other grounds, 753 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2000). Until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Betancourt, there was a dispute over whether Act
IIl even provided for grievance arbitration. See Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 87 (Pa. 1995).
Several courts, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Betancourt, had determined
that Act 111 did not provide for grievance arbitration. See id.
49. UpperMakefield Township, 717 A.2d at 601. As noted above, since the Betancourt
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view of the legislature's virtual oversight of grievance arbitration under Act
11, it is very debatable that the same standard of review should be applied
to both grievance and interest arbitration awards under Act 11. This is
particularly true in light of the different purposes of interest and grievance
arbitration.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the essence test to
be inconsistent with Act 111, the analysis in support of the application of
the narrow certiorari scope of review does not adequately balance the
perceived purpose of Act 11l with the purpose of grievance arbitration and
the role it plays in collective bargaining. Section 1 of Act 111 clearly states
that one of its purposes was to allow police to collectively bargain and to
enter into contractual agreement with public employers. 5' Arbitration
under Act Ill has been determined to be an extension of collective
bargaining.52
Yet, as highlighted by Bensalem Township and Smith, the narrow
certiorari scope of review does not focus on the agreement or the parties'
intent during collective bargaining. In fact, the narrow certiorari scope of
review does not even consider the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. As a result, there is a significant risk that the agreement the
parties collectively bargained will not be enforced as intended. This
potentially cheapens the value of collective bargaining under Act 111, and
threatens to deteriorate the process to an empty formality. Such a result is
contrary to and defeats the clearly-stated purpose of Act 111. The
Betancourt decision did not balance this concern but focused almost
entirely on the legislature's apparent desire for swift resolutions of labor
disputes under Act I111.
The need for a swift resolution of labor disputes, however, is nothing
new in labor policy on the federal level or in the Commonwealth, and does
not support or require the application of the narrow certiorari scope of
review. The swift resolution of labor disputes has been recognized as one
of the main reasons for grievance arbitration under both federal and
Pennsylvania labor policy. Even so, federal and Pennsylvania courts apply
the essence test when reviewing grievance arbitration awards.
Court determined that the essence test was inconsistent with Act 111, the proper scope of
review was the narrow certiorari scope of review that had been applied to the judicial review
of interest arbitration awards.
50. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 1992).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Dunmore Police Ass'n v. Borough of Dunmore, 528 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1987);
Pottstown Police Officers' Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 634 A.2d 711 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993).
53. Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 83. The Court also noted that police and fire personnel do
not have a right to strike under Act Il1 or Pennsylvania law. That fact alone, however, does
not require or justify the Betancourtstandard.
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Furthermore, even though the essence test will allow slightly more
judicial oversight, it is not by any means a strict or even high standard of
scrutiny. The essence test, as noted above, was formulated so courts would
be deferential to arbitration awards and intervene only where an arbitrator
clearly did not satisfy his obligation to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement.
Likewise, the same judicial procedures essentially are
followed regardless of whether the arbitration award being challenged is
reviewed under the narrow certiorari scope of review or the essence test.
Thus, it can hardly be said that the application of the essence test will result
in arbitration awards and employment disputes being "mired in protracted
litigation"5 5 any more than the application of the narrow certiorari scope of
review.56
A narrow certiorari scope of review is unnecessary under Act 111
despite the concern that the statute specifically states that there shall be no
appeal from an arbitration award. This argument is unpersuasive if one
compares Act 111 to Act 195. Act 195, it should be noted, states that
arbitration decisions shall be "final and binding., 57 It appears that both
statutes anticipated arbitration decisions being final. Thus, the slight
difference in wording provides little justification for applying the different
scopes of review.58
Although one can quibble with analysis of the Betancourt decision,
the Court's reasoning was certainly not without merit or foundation.
Indeed, the legislature has not taken any action to supercede the Betancourt
decision. The only way to correct this problematic scope of review is for
legislative action to clarify that the essence test, as articulated by the
Pennsylvania courts under the UAA, applies to grievance arbitration
awards under Act 1 11. The goal of interest arbitration is to formulate the
terms of a new collective bargaining agreement because the parties were

54. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 413.
55. Betancourt,656 A.2d at 89.
56. The lack of any meaningful review of an arbitration award under the Betancourt
standard will provide a disincentive to appeal arbitration awards, but as noted above, that
concern should apply equally to arbitration awards under Act 195 as well.
57. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.903 (West 1991).

58. Similar reasoning applies to the fact that Act 111 prohibits police and fire personnel
from striking. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 1992). Act 195, although not
prohibiting strikes, limits the rights of non-uniformed public employees to strike. From a
practical perspective, the limitations placed on the right to strike under Act 195 make it very
difficult for a non-uniformed employee to engage in a lawful strike based on an event that
gives rise to a grievance. Further, guards at prisons and mental institutions and certain court
personnel do not have the right to strike and are subject to binding interest arbitration
procedures under Act 195. 43 P.S. §1101.805. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that grievance arbitration awards involving such employees under Act 195
are reviewed under the "essence test." See County of Centre v. Musser, 519 Pa. 380, 548
A.2d 1194 (1984).
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unable to do so. In such a situation, "review of whether an interest award
draws its essence from a nonexistent agreement would be oxymoronic." 59
The narrow certiorari scope of review is appropriate for interest
arbitration awards in which the arbitration panel is essentially creating or
amending the collective bargaining agreement. As highlighted above,
however, that standard has no place in the review of a grievance arbitration
award. Action by the legislature to clarify that the essence test, as
formulated under the UAA, applies to the review of grievance arbitration
awards would provide for the swift resolution of labor disputes as well as
protect the sanctity of the collective bargaining relationship.

59. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 725 A.2d 206, 209
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).

